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STRONG PSEUDO PRIMES TO BASE 2
KUBRA NARI, ENVER OZDEMIR, AND NESLIHAN AYSEN OZKIRISCI
Abstract. In this work, we add an additional condition to strong pseudo
prime test to base 2. Then, we provide theoretical and heuristics evidences
showing that the resulting algorithm catches all composite numbers. Our
method is based on the structure of singular cubics’ Jacobian groups on which
we also define an effective addition algorithm.
Introduction
It has been an interest of scientists that for a given integer n construct a method
to decide if n has a non-trivial divisor or not. In theory, it is very easy to say
whether an integer has a non-trivial factor or not since a number is composite if
and only if it has a factor less than
√
n. The popularity of digital communication
along with cryptographic methods which employ prime numbers forces to design
an efficient way in practice deciding if n has a factor or not. Even though, the first
algorithms for primality utilize basic group theory, they are still more practical and
popular than the sophisticated ones which utilize advanced mathematical tools like
elliptic curve groups and cyclotomic fields.
Let n be an integer, the multiplicative group modulo n has order n−1 if n has no
non-trivial factor. This fact has been known for a long time and employed in many
ways. For example an easy consequence of it is Fermat’s little theorem. Another
application [15] was presented by M. Rabin who offered a method based on this to
detect composite integers. His method works as follows:
(1) For a given odd integer n, find e and odd integer m such that
n− 1 = 2em
(2) Select a random number a.
(3) See if a2
i
m = ci is congruent to 1 or -1 modulo n for any 0 ≤ i ≤ e− 1.
(4) If none of ci is 1 or -1 for i = 0, . . . , e − 1, then declare n a composite
number.
Unfortunately, the test doesn’t say primality of the number a if one of ci is 1 or
-1. In general, this test repeats for a few distinct a’s and the number a is selected
to be a prime starting with 2 and continue with consecutive primes 3, 5, 7, 11
and so on. The test with a random integer a is called strong pseudo prime test to
base a. If the test doesn’t say the number n is composite then n is called a strong
pseudo prime to base a. The set of all strong pseudo primes to base a is denoted
by spsp(a). If an integer n ∈ spsp(a) then the probability of n being a prime is
more than 75% [17]. G. Miller [10] later showed that if n is spsp(a) for all prime
integers a ≤ 2 log2 n then n must be prime if GRH is correct.
Two significant algorithms [1, 3] were presented for primality testing in 80s. The
first one describes a deterministic method to decide whether an integer n is really
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a prime number, but it fails to be a polynomial time algorithm [1, 17]. The second
one decides an integer n is prime if it can construct an elliptic curve group E
modulo n such that E has a point of order larger than a certain integer depending
on n. This algorithm is much faster than the first one but it might not be able to
produce the desired elliptic curve group E therefore the algorithm is probabilistic
[17]. We should also mention that in early 2000, a deterministic and polynomial
time algorithm [2] was presented but for a given integer n the algorithm’s running
time is O(log12+ǫ n) for ǫ > 0 [17].
The aforementioned [1, 3] algorithms for primality test are not as efficient as the
strong pseudo prime (spsp) test. Even though, the spsp test doesn’t guarantee the
primality of an integer, it has been widely utilized in commercial applications. The
efficiency of spsp test in addition to not being a complete primality test encourage
scientists to open new avenues for research to improve the test. In that respect,
the work [14] presented an idea that aim to find all composite numbers which are
the elements of spsp to certain bases. A partial answer, which gives all elements of
spsp less than a certain integer, is also presented in it. The idea later expanded in
many ways [7, 20, 21]. For example, suppose one finds the set S of all composite
numbers less than t which are spsp to prime bases p1, . . . , ps then we have an
efficient primality test for all numbers less than t. In fact, let n < t be an element
of spsp(p1, . . . , ps) and n 6∈ S then n must be a prime integer. Therefore, the
research has been focused on to classify composite strong pseudo prime numbers to
bases 2, 3, 5 and so on. For example, if n is in spsp(2), intuitively gcd(n− 1, p− 1)
must be large for any prime factor p of n. In fact, the experimental results show
that for some prime factors p of n we have gcd(d(n−1), (p−1)) = p−1 and d < 20
for n with at most 15 digits [7].
The research on the classification of strong pseudo primes to small bases revealed
useful information. The experimental results in the work [7] shows that if n ∈
spsp(2) and composite then n has only two prime factors, say p and q, with a
probability more than 95%. In addition to this, gcd(s1(p − 1), d1(q − 1)) = p − 1
and gcd(s2(p− 1), d2(n− 1)) = p− 1 and s1, s2, d1, d2 < 20.
In this research we aim to construct a method to detect compositeness of integers
which are the members of spsp(2). In this respect, we first present the properties of
strong pseudo primes to base 2. Then a method which detects compositeness of such
numbers will be presented. Even though, it is theoretically hard to define all types
of n ∈ spsp(2), the experiment results show that our method is a primality test for
all integers with less than 22 digits. In addition to this, the algorithm detects all
strong pseudo prime integers in set S which is in http:\kripto.itu.edu.tr. In
the next section, we introduce our main tool singular cubic and then present the
method.
1. Singular Cubics
Let Fq be a finite field with q elements. The integer q is considered to be a prime
number from now on. A singular cubic curve E is defined by an equation
E : y2 = x(x − a)2
for some 0 6= a ∈ Fq. Any point on the curve except (a, 0) is called a non-singular
point. The set of all non-singular points in addition to a point at infinity form an
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abelian group [18]. Let denote this group by E(Fq). The following theorem gives
the structure the group E(Fq).
Theorem 1.1. Let E and Fq be as above. The group E(Fq) is cyclic and of order
(1) q − 1 if a is a square in Fq.
(2) q + 1 if a is not a square in Fq.
Proof. See Theorem 2.31 in [18]. 
It is very easy to determine a point in E(Fq). In fact, for any b 6= a ∈ Fq,
(b2, b(b2 − a)) is an element of E(Fq). The group operation in E(Fq) can be per-
formed as performing group operation in an elliptic curve group [Chapter 2, [18]].
The curves that are exploited in this work are of special form, that is, there are all
defined by equations
y2 = x(x− a)2 over Fq.
In other words, these cubic curves are actually nodal curves [12]. Group operation
and representation of elements in respective Jacobian group can be performed in
a more simple way. If we apply these to our special curves, we get the following
theorem.
Theorem 1.2. Let E be a singular cubic defined over the field Fq defined by an
equation
y2 = x(x − a)2.
Any point (x, y) on the curve E(Fq) is uniquely represented by a constant t such
that
t2 6= a.
In addition, suppose that D1 = t1, D2 = t2 ∈ E(Fq) then D1 +D2 is defined by
t1t2 + a
t1 + t2
in Fq.
Proof. The proof is based on Algorithm 1 in [12]. Our singular curve E is defined
with the equation y2 = xf2(x) where f(x) = x − a. Any point on the Jacobian of
the curve is defined by a single polynomial h(x) such that deg h(x) < deg f(x). As
f(x) = x− a in our case, h(x) must be a constant. Let D1 and D2 are represented
by t1, t2 ∈ Fq respectively. Then
D = D1 +D2
is represented by t such that
t ≡ g1(x− a) + g2(t1t2 + x) mod x− a
where
g1(x− a) + g2(t1 + t2) = 1.
In this setup, we get
g1 = 0 and g2 =
1
t1 + t2
Hence
t ≡ t1t2 + x
t1 + t2
≡ t1t2 + a
t1 + t2
mod x− a

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The pseudo code of the method which is based on above theorem is given below
in Algorithm 1. Note that Algorithm 1 is for all integer n and it returns either
addition of two group elements or a factor of n if it is a composite integer. Even
though we can also use the regular group operation defined for elliptic curves, our
algorithm requires only two multiplication and one inversion for an addition in any
ring Zn.
Algorithm 1: Group Operation
Result: Q = P +K on Jacobian of E : y2 = x(x − a)2 over Zn
1 P = t;
2 K = k;
Input: t, k, a, n
3 if t = 0 then
4 return k;
5 end
6 if k = 0 then
7 return t;
8 end
9 if t = 0 and k = 0 then
10 return 0;
11 else
12 if gcd((t+ k), n)! = 0 then
13 if gcd((t+ k), n) = n then
14 return 0;
15 end
16 if gcd((t+ k), n) = 1 then
17 inv =
1
t+ k
mod n;
18 return (tk + a) · inv mod n;
19 end
20 else
21 return gcd(t+ k, n);
22 end
23 end
2. Primality Test
Let n be an element of spsp(2). The algorithm first selects an integer a such
that Legendre’s symbol ( a
n
)
= −1
The selection can be efficiently performed with quadratic reciprocity law. The
quadratic reciprocity law indicates
(a
n
)
= (−1) (a−1)(n−1)4
(n
a
)
Therefore, for the sake of computational complexity, the integer a is selected to
be a prime number. At the current state of the art, the only way to find such a
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prime integer a is the trial&error method.
Let E be a curve defined by y2 = x(x− a)2 over Zn. The group structure of the
curve over Zn is very well known if the integer n is prime. Computing in E(Zn)
can be performed by the chord-tangent method even if n is not a prime number
[5]. The next theorem stated by H. Lenstra [9] exploits addition algorithm in the
elliptic curve groups over the ring Zn for the factorization.
Theorem 2.1. Let E be an elliptic curve over the ring Zn and p be a factor of n.
Let Q be an element of E(Zn). Q is also an element of E over Zp. Suppose that Q
has order dividing t in E(Zp) and the order of Q ∈ E(Zr) is coprime to t for any
prime factor r of n. Then computing tQ in E(Zn) fails and gives the factor p.
Lenstra’s factorization algorithm in some sense is a modified version of p − 1
method [13] and it is very efficient to find a small factor of composite integers.
The proposed method in this work is also considered to be a modified version of
combining p− 1 and p + 1 methods [13, 19]. In addition to this, our method also
exploits the structure of the group E(Zn).
Let n be an odd integer. Let us define a singular cubic E with the equation
E : y2 = x(x − a)2 on Zn.
If the integer n is prime, then the order of E(Zn) must be n + 1. This fact is
also being employed by the algorithm to catch composite numbers. The steps of
our algorithm are presented below.
2.1. Primality Test Algorithm.
(1) Check if n is strong pseudo prime to base 2. If it is not then declare n
composite, otherwise go to the next step.
(2) Start a = 5 and check whether
(n
a
)
= −1. If yes, proceed to next step.
Otherwise, change a to the next prime such that a ≡ 1 mod 4 until
(n
a
)
=
−1.
(3) Define the curve E with equation y2 = x(x− a)2 on Zn.
(4) Find a point P mod n whose order is not 100 or less and 2bP is not identity
mod n where b is the multiplication of all primes less than 100. Note that
for any ℓ ∈ Zn, (ℓ2, ℓ(ℓ− a)) is a point on E mod n.
(5) Compute Q = b(n− 1)P + 2bP mod n where b is again the multiplication
of all primes less than 100. Note that Q = b(n+ 1)P .
(6) If Q is not identity in E(Zn), then n is composite otherwise n is prime.
The below discussion describes evidences that the above algorithm might be a
primality test.
The algorithm starts with an integer n which passes the strong pseudo prime test
to base 2. Several studies have been conducted to give an explicit characterization
of such composite integers [7, 14, 20, 21]. The experimental results show that
a majority of such integers n have only two factors. For example, the work [7]
indicates that more than 95% of the n have two factors p and q such that
s(q−1) = d1(p−1) and p−1 | k(n−1) and q−1 | d2(n−1) with s, d1, d2, k ≤ 100.
Theorem 2.2. Let n be a strong pseudo prime to base 2 and the primes p, q are
the only factors of n. If p and q are of above form, then the algorithm catches
compositeness of such an integer n.
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Proof. The prime integer a is selected to be(a
n
)
= −1.
This implies a is a quadratic non-residue modulo p or q but not both.
Case 1: (
a
p
)
= −1 and
(
a
q
)
= 1
Note that
q − 1 | t1(n− 1) for some integers t1 ≤ 100.
The point P in E(Zq) has order dividing q − 1 and in E(Zp) has order
dividing p+1. Let b be the multiplication of all primes less than 100. Then
b(n− 1)P =∞ mod q
If also b(n− 1)P =∞ mod p, then
b(n− 1)P =∞ mod n.
This means that
Q = b(n− 1)P + 2bP = b(n+ 1)P 6=∞ mod n
That says n is not a prime number.
On the contrary, suppose that b(n − 1)P 6= ∞ mod p. In this case, com-
puting b(n− 1)P mod n fails and returns q. The argument shows that in
Case 1, the algorithm definitely catches the compositeness of n.
Case 2: (
a
p
)
= 1 and
(
a
q
)
= −1
As t3(n− 1) = t4(p− 1) for some integers t3, t4 ≤ 100. A similar argument
in Case 1 shows the algorithm catches compositeness of the n.

Theorem 2.3. Let n be a strong pseudo prime to base 2 and the primes p, q and r
are the only factors of n. If the values of gcd(n−1, p−1), gcd(n−1, q−1) and gcd(n−
1, r− 1) are large, then the algorithm might catch compositeness of such an integer
n.
Proof. The prime integer a is selected to be(a
n
)
= −1.
If a is a quadratic non-residue for only one factor of n, then the above theorem can
be applied. Now we handle the case that a is a quadratic non-residue modulo p, q
and r, that is, (
a
p
)
= −1 and
(
a
q
)
= −1 and
(a
r
)
= −1.
Since n is a strong pseudo prime to base 2,
#2 | p− 1,#2 | q − 1 and #2 | r − 1
STRONG PSEUDO PRIMES TO BASE 2 7
where #2 is the order of 2 in the respected modular group. Basically, it says
gcd(n − 1, p − 1), gcd(n − 1, q − 1) and gcd(n − 1, r − 1) are large. On the other
hand, for any point P in E(Zn) with the order dividing n+1, it is obvious that the
order of P in E(Zp) divides p+1, in E(Zq) divides q+1 and in E(Zr) divides r+1.
Therefore, if (n+1)P is the identity mod n then gcd(n+1, p+1), gcd(n+1, q+1)
and gcd(n+1, r+1) are all large. However, it is highly improbable that not only the
numbers p−1, q−1, r−1 but also p+1, q+1, r+1 have large common divisors. 
Note that intuitively n ∈ spsp(2) implies gcd(n− 1, p− 1), gcd(n− 1, q− 1) and
gcd(n−1, r−1) are large when n = pqr. Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 keeps us staying on
the safe side. On the other hand, we believe it is not necessary to check a random
point P on E(Zn) has order less than 100. Algorithm 2 offers a less costly version of
Algorithm 2.1. We conduct heuristics tests with Algorithm 2 to see if it misses any
composite number, but we were not able to find one. Basically, the test checks all
integers less than 1021 and it catches all composite ones. The further experiments
involving integers from a couple hundreds to several thousands digits were also able
to discover compositeness of integers. Therefore, we believe that Algorithm 2 will
never fail to catch compositeness any integer and we conclude the work with the
following conjecture.
Algorithm 2: Primality Test
Result: n is prime or not.
Input: n;
1 if n ∈ spsp(2) then
2 a = 5;
3 i = 0;
4 while i = 0 do
5 if a ≡ 1 mod 4 and
(n
a
)
= −1 then
6 i = 1;
7 else
8 a =nextprime(a);
9 end
10 end
11 E : y2 = x(x − a)2;
12 P = t;
13 Q = (n− 1)P + 2P ;
14 if Q = identity then
15 return true;
16 else
17 return false;
18 end
19 else
20 return false;
21 end
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Conjecture: Algorithm 2 is a primality test with a running time of O(log2 n) for
a given integer n.
In order to illustrate benefit of proving or accepting above conjecture, we present
timings (miliseconds) of primality test algorithms for integers of different size.
Size (bits) ECPP Cyclotomic Field Test Singular Cubic Test
256 28.5 51 2.4
512 398.8 497 9.4
1024 4691.5 14880 42.1
2048 87375.6 413408 210.6
The test are conducted on a computer with operating system macOS, 16 GB
memory, Intel i5 3.8 GHz CPU. The codes are written in C++ language.
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